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The Dawn of a Judicial Takings Doctrine:
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Department of Environmental
Protection
BRENDAN MACKESEY*
In Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department
of Environmental Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010), the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the Florida Supreme Court had violated a group of littoral
property owners’ Fifth Amendment rights—or committed a
“judicial taking”—by upholding the state of Florida’s
Beach and Shore Preservation Act. Under the Act, the State
is entitled to ownership of previously submerged land it restores as beach; this is true even though the normal private/state property line, the mean-high water line, is moved
seaward, and the affected littoral owner(s) lose their right to
have their property abut the water. Although a four-justice
plurality led by Justice Scalia held that that the Florida Supreme Court did not violate the Fifth Amendment in this instance, the plurality recognized that it is unconstitutional for
any branch of state government to declare that what was
once an established private property right no longer exists—
*
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without providing just compensation. In so doing, the plurality appears to endorse a judicial taking doctrine.
This Article explores the institutional and policy ramifications of such a doctrine—ultimately concluding that the
due process analysis advocated by Justice Kennedy in concurrence is a better doctrinal mechanism to corral wayward
judges. After exploring the procedural and federalism concerns raised by a judicial takings doctrine, the Article hypothesizes the viewpoints of several famous deceased takings scholars. The Article then evaluates the position of living taking scholars Eduardo M. Penalver and Lihor Strahilevitz, whom propose a flexible approach that considers Takings Clause and due process analysis on a case-by-case basis.
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INTRODUCTION
Can a judge commit a taking? Despite befuddling courts and
property scholars for years, this deceptively simple question was not
scrutinized by the U.S. Supreme Court until recently. In Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection,1 a four-justice plurality affirmed that the judiciary
should be treated like any other state entity under the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment2—implicitly endorsing a “judicial takings”
doctrine in the process. Although the other four justices3 concurred
in the judgment of the case, they did not endorse a judicial takings
doctrine. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg avoided the judicial takings
question altogether,4 while Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor argued
that judicial takings should be invalidated under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5
Stop the Beach arose after a group of oceanfront property owners
in the City of Destin and Walton County challenged Florida’s Beach
and Shore Preservation Act of 1961 (the “Act”).6 The Act authorized
the local government to add approximately seventy-five feet of dry
sand seaward of the mean high-water line (the “MHWL”) across 6.9
miles of eroded beach.7 To the property owners’ chagrin, this restored beach was to be owned by the state.8 After the property
1

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S.
702 (2010).
2
See id. at 715 (“In sum, the Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of
the taking.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3
Justice Stevens recused himself from the case. See infra note 137.
4
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 742–45 (Breyer, J., concurring).
5
See id. at 733–42 (Kennedy, J., concurring); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 710–12; Beach and Shore Preservation Act
of 1961, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–.45 (2020).
7
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 711.
8
See id.
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owners exhausted their administrative remedies without success,9
the Florida First District Court of Appeal (the “First DCA”) heard
the case on direct appeal.10 The First DCA held that the property
owners were entitled to compensation, but the Florida Supreme
Court disagreed.11 The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari to determine whether the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment itself constituted a judicial taking or otherwise violated the
property owners’ due process rights.12 Citing the state’s right to fill
submerged land and take ownership of land created by avulsion,13
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment and found no judicial taking.14 Nevertheless, the plurality was
crystal-clear that a taking occurs when “a court declares that what
was once an established right of private property no longer exists.”15
Unfortunately, the plurality did not expound upon the ramifications
of this mandate.
This Article begins with a summary of the major principles and
landmarks of takings law in Part I. Dicta from the U.S. Supreme
Court on judicial takings is also explored here. Part II covers the
history of Stop the Beach and breaks down the opinions of Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer. Part III details the procedural and federalism concerns raised by a judicial takings doctrine and examines
the potential for judicial abuse of “background principles” of state
property law. The part concludes with an argument for due process.
9
See Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., DOAH Case Nos. 042960/04-3261, 2005 WL 1543209 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs. Jun. 30, 2005) (recommended order). This recommended order from the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings was later enforced by the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection. See Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., DEP Nos.
DEP:05-0791/04-1370, 2005 WL 1927305 (Fla. Dep’t Env’t Prot. Jul. 27, 2005)
(final order).
10
See Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 27 So. 3d 48 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach, 560
U.S. 702.
11
Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1121.
12
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 707, 712.
13
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 730; An avulsion refers to a sudden gain
or loss of land resulting from the action of water. Avulsion, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
14
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 733.
15
Id. at 715 (emphasis omitted).
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The last part of this Article, Part IV, analyzes an article authored on
judicial takings by Professors Eduardo M. Peñalver and Lior Strahilevitz.
I.

THE ROAD TO STOP THE BEACH

A.
The Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process
A quick review of pertinent constitutional law is necessary. The
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: “No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.”16 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment follows
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”17 Although the Fifth Amendment does not apply directly to the states, the Fourteenth Amendment—which contains a
Due Process Clause with similar language to the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause—does.18 Further, the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.19 Thus, the
states may not take private property for public use without providing
compensation.
The Due Process and Takings Clauses both limit the police
power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.20 Although “insusceptible of strict definition,”21 the police power generally permits the state to regulate the conduct and property of its citizens for the health, safety, and moral welfare of the public.22
16

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id.
18
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19
Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236–37 (1897);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1994); see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 829 (1987).
20
See U.S. CONST. amend X.
21
CARMAN F. RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED
STATES 10 (1894); accord Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)
(“Except for the substitution of the familiar term of ‘reasonableness,’ the Court
has generally refrained from announcing any specific criteria [for the police
power].”).
22
See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 6 (1904); see also Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111–13 (1911); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
395, 410–11 (1915); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1928).
17
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Examples of the police power include protecting resources,23 preventing nuisances,24 and enacting zoning ordinances.25 In evaluating
an exercise of police power, courts usually apply the “rational basis”
test, which assesses whether the regulation is non-arbitrary and reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose.26 The flexible nature
of this test makes it difficult to identify concrete limits to the police
power. As former Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw eloquently put it, “[i]t is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and source of this [police] power, than to mark its boundaries
or prescribe limits to its exercise.”27
A regulation may be challenged as an invalid exercise of police
power under the substantive language of the Due Process Clause.28
23

Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (navigable
waters); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (forests).
24
Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 411 (air pollution); Miller, 276 U.S. at 278–80
(tree disease).
25
Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (upholding a zoning ordinance to prevent industry growth); Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
227 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928) (holding zoning ordinance invalid under the Due
Process Clause).
26
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (establishing rational basis review for economic activity). When the regulation under
review affects fundamental rights or people classified by race, religion, or national
origin, “strict” judicial scrutiny applies instead of “rational basis” review. See
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310–11 (1880) (holding that states cannot prohibit jury service based solely on race); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (finding that laws that target a racial group are “immediately
suspect” and subject to “the most rigid scrutiny”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11–12 (1967) (holding that restricting the right to marry based on race is subject
to the rigid scrutiny); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (explaining that some liberties are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental and therefore cannot be deprived without compelling justification). Under this heightened level of review, a court asks whether the
act is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling public purpose. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Likewise, regulations based on gender and illegitimacy are subject to “intermediate” judicial scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197–200 (1976). This test asks whether the act is “substantially related
to an important public interest.” Id.
27
RANDOLPH, supra note 21, at 10 (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 61
Mass. 53, 85 (1851)); see also CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW 3 (Alan T. Ackerman & Darius W. Dynkowski eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“The concept of public welfare
is broad and inclusive . . . .” (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954))).
28
TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES 6 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002).
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The merit of such claims has fluctuated with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s stance on substantive due process. Initially, the Court correlated substantive due process protections with vested property interests.29 In the early twentieth century, the Court moved towards the
“liberty” end of the due process spectrum, protecting employers’
rights to establish employee wages and working conditions.30 However, the harsh economic realities of the Great Depression eventually convinced the Supreme Court to defer to the legislature on such
employment matters.31 Consequently, the Court ceased applying the
Due Process Clause to economic regulation.32 A popular criticism
of Justice Kennedy’s due process approach is that it would signal a
return to the Lochner era of the early twentieth century, as property
law typically involves some form of economic regulation.33 Nevertheless, the Court continues to rely on the Due Process Clause to
protect “fundamental” individual rights, including property interests.34
29

See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449–52 (1857)
(finding that slaves were a vested property interest), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
30
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down a state
statute prescribing employee hours); Adkins v. Child.’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561–
62 (1923) (rejecting federal minimum wage legislation for women).
31
See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (“We
may take judicial notice of the unparalleled demands for relief which arose during
the recent period of depression and still continue to an alarming extent.”).
32
See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“[C]ourts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.”).
33
See Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process,
Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 419 (2001)
(“To rely on due process would risk resuscitating one of the most discredited doctrines in the Court’s history—the repudiated Lochner view that substantive due
process limits government economic regulation.”).
34
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a defendant who would be entitled to a jury trial in
federal court the right to a jury trial in state court); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 204–05 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Due Process Clause creates an affirmative duty for the state to protect children
from abuse); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding that the right to
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment extends to a woman’s right to choose
whether to have an abortion); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
520–21 (1977) (invalidating a housing code provision that restricted which family
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B.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Takings Jurisprudence
After the Supreme Court stopped analyzing economic regulation
under the Due Process Clause, it found another avenue to attack such
regulation affecting property rights: a regulatory takings doctrine. In
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,35 Justice Holmes proclaimed that
a regulation that “goes too far” may constitute a taking.36 The only
measuring stick Holmes provided was the “extent of diminution” of
the property value.37 Holmes did not clarify when the judiciary
should invalidate a regulation under the Due Process Clause as opposed to order the government to pay compensation under the Takings Clause.38 In practice, Mahon prevented the government from
dodging compensation by regulating property rather than seizing it.
About fifty years later in Penn Central Transportation Agency
v. New York City,39 the Court finally added some substance to its
regulatory takings doctrine. Endorsing a judicial ad hoc factual inquiry into state property legislation, Justice Brennan set forth a test
(the “Penn Central Test”) weighing the (1) character of the government action and (2) economic effect of the regulation on the property owner; particularly the extent to which the regulation has interfered with any “distinct investment-backed expectations.”40 By permitting judges to evaluate the merits of property regulation, the
Court blurred the line between the Takings and Due Process
Clauses. Consequently, it is not always clear whether a regulation
should be viewed as an act of eminent domain requiring compensation or an invalid exercise of police power.41 Notably, however, in
members could live together under substantive due process); Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (upholding a town mining ordinance as
a valid exercise of the police power).
35
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
36
Id. at 415.
37
Id. at 413.
38
Id. at 415 (discussing both the Due Process Clause and Takings Clause but
offering no clear indication of when the judiciary should invalidate a regulation
under either Clause).
39
Penn Cent. Transp. Agency v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
40
Id. at 124–25.
41
Compare First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314–15 (1987) (compensation is due for temporary
taking resulting from a zoning ordinance), with Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 261 (1980) (applying an ad hoc balancing test to a zoning ordinance).
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Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,42 the Court discounted the role substantive due process plays in regulatory takings analysis.43 Speaking
for the majority, Justice O’Connor emphasized the deference courts
should give to legislative judgments.44 Property owners seeking redress for the burden imposed on their property by a state action may
not seek to invalidate the state action—they may only seek compensation for it; a due process challenge to the efficacy of a regulation
is a wholly distinguishable, separate action.45
The Penn Central test has been relied upon and tinkered with by
the U.S. Supreme Court for many years now.46 It is arguably the
most important takings case in U.S. history. That said, no case has
been more important to the rise of judicial takings than Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.47 In Lucas, the Court held that the
state may restrict private property use without compensation as long
as the restriction accords with “background principles” of state
property and nuisance law.48 As discussed later in this Article, illusory “background principles” are the common foundation for a judicial taking.49 However, the most immediate and practical consequence of Lucas resulted from the Court’s clarification that a per se
taking occurs when a property owner is deprived of all economically
42

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,544 U.S. 528 (2005).
Id. at 540 (“We conclude that this formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and that it has no proper place in our
takings jurisprudence.”). Justice Kennedy submitted a brief concurrence “to note
that today’s decision does not foreclose the possibility that a regulation might be
so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process.” Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
44
See id. at 545 (majority opinion).
45
See id. at 536–37.
46
See, e.g., Agins, 447 U.S. at 260–62 (applying a modified two-step Penn
Central balancing test, asking whether the regulation (1) substantially advances a
state interest, and (2) deprives the owner economically viable use of his land).
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545 (rejecting the Agins test in favor of the Penn Central test);
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342
(2002) (rejecting a per se taking rule and favoring the Penn Central test for temporary takings).
47
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
48
Id. at 1029. The logic is that such property use was never part of the
owner’s title to begin with. Id. For an in-depth discussion of background principles see TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES, supra note 28, at 163–79.
49
See infra Part III.C.
43
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beneficial use of his land.50 Indeed, nine years later in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island,51 the Court denied a per se taking had occurred because the affected parcel retained approximately six percent of its
total value.52
The Court affirmed the “deprivation of all economically beneficial use” per se taking standard in Lingle.53 There, Justice O’Connor
iterated that the only other instance when a per se taking occurs is
where the government physically invades private property.54 (According to O’Connor, other takings claims must be analyzed under
Penn Central.55) In Stop the Beach, Justice Scalia seemed to identify
a third per se takings standard, where “[the state] recharacterize[s]
as public property what was previously private property.”56 This
standard is the premise for the judicial takings doctrine raised by the
Stop the Beach plurality.57

50

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
52
See id. at 616. The Court did, however, remand the case to apply a Penn
Central test. Id. at 632.
53
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
54
See id. at 547–48. For precedent establishing the “physical invasion” per
se taking standard, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 438, 441(1982) (holding that negligible cable installation equipment constitutes a permanent physical invasion of property and is therefore a taking). See also
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967)
(discussing “physical invasion” per se taking standard).
55
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548. The only other exception is land-use exactions,
which are analyzed under a two-step test established in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (proposing the “essential nexus” requirement between
the condition imposed on development and state interest advanced by the restriction); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (describing the “rough proportionality” requirement between the condition imposed and the estimated impact of the proposed
development).
56
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560
U.S. 702, 713 (2010) (“States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public property what was previously private property.” (citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163–65 (1980))).
57
To compare a state “recharacterizing as public property what was previously private property,” id., with “declar[ing] what was once an established right
of private property no longer exists,” see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
These are very similar actions.
51
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C.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Historic Approach to Judicial
Takings
The Supreme Court first hinted at the idea of a judicial taking in
Muhlker v. New York & Harlem Railroad Co.58 A four-justice plurality enounced that state courts can declare or modify property law
as they see fit but cannot divest one’s contractual rights (under the
Contracts Clause of the Constitution) in the process.59 However,
four dissenting justices argued that property law was a “construction
of the courts” that can be changed regardless of constitutional restrictions.60 Consequently, Muhlker did not create any strong precedent for judicial takings.61
Around the 1930s, the Court released a series of opinions suggesting that judicial changes in the law cannot violate the Takings
Clause. In Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan,62 the Court reasoned that because no constitutional issue arises when a state court defines property, no constitutional issue arises when a state court re-defines
property.63 Therefore, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
such cases.64 The Court reconciled its decision with Muhlker—
which involved a similar contractual right of property enjoyment—
by pointing out that the Muhlker plaintiff’s rights had been impaired
by a state statute.65 Thus, the constitutional protections of the Contracts Clause only apply to legislative acts, not judicial decisions.66
In Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,67 the Court reversed a state court ruling that abruptly altered state jurisdiction over
administrative manners, thereby depriving the plaintiff of a forum
58

See Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 554, 570 (1905). The Supreme Court had already established that the Takings Clause applies to judicial
action. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–35
(1897). However, the Quincy Railroad court did not address whether the Takings
Clause applies when the judiciary actually changes property law. See id.
59
Muhlker, 197 U.S. at 570.
60
Id. at 572–74 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
61
See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1465
(1990) (“Faced with internal disagreement on judicial takings, the Court proceeded to waffle on the issue for several decades.”).
62
Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924).
63
See id. at 452–53, 455.
64
Id. at 455–56.
65
Id. at 452–53.
66
See id. at 450–51.
67
Brinkerhoff-Faris Tr. & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
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to challenge a property tax.68 Because the plaintiff was deprived of
an opportunity to be heard, however, the Court had only rectified a
procedural due process violation.69 Justice Brandeis underscored
that “[s]tate courts . . . may [still] ordinarily overrule their own decisions without offending constitutional guarantees, even though
parties may have acted to their prejudice on the faith of the earlier
decisions.”70 Two years later, in Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.,71 Justice Cardozo emphasized that state
courts are entitled to “adhere[] to precedent” however they see fit.72
According to Cardozo, nothing in the Constitution prevents a state
court from retroactively applying a new statute or rule of law to a
prior decision.73 Read together, Tidal Oil, Brinkerhoff, and Great
Northern Railway seem to discard any notion of judicial takings that
can be gleaned from Muhlker.
It wasn’t until 1967 that Justice Stewart would single-handedly
revive the judicial takings concept. In Hughes v. Washington,74 the
Court granted certiorari to determine ownership of an accretion75
between a littoral property owner and the state.76 The Washington
Supreme Court overruled precedent favoring the property owner by
granting the accretion to the state, claiming that any private right to
the accretion was forfeited when the state adopted its constitution in
1889.77 By abruptly interpreting the state constitution to override established precedent, the Washington Supreme Court essentially
“changed” state property law.78 The U.S. Supreme Court majority
reversed the judgment, but dodged the judicial takings question by
holding that accretion ownership is controlled by federal law, which
dictates that property owners are entitled to accretions.79 In a
68

Id. at 675–78.
Id. at 681–82.
70
Id. at 681 n.8.
71
Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refin. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
72
See id. at 364.
73
Id. at 364–65.
74
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
75
In the context of property law, accretion refers to the gradual accumulation
of land by natural forces. Accretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
76
Hughes, 389 U.S. at 290–91.
77
Id. at 291.
78
Id. at 297 (Stewart, J., concurring).
79
Id. at 291, 294 (majority opinion).
69
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concurring opinion, Justice Stewart argued that the ownership question in Hughes—like all real property issues—should be decided under state law.80 Stewart further explained that constitutional safeguards prevent state courts from abruptly abrogating established
property rights:
To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court
of Washington . . . arguably conforms to reasonable
expectations, we must of course accept it as conclusive. But to the extent that it constitutes a sudden
change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents, no such deference would be appropriate. For a State cannot be permitted to defeat the
constitutional prohibition against taking property
without due process of law by the simple device of
asserting retroactively that the property it has taken
never existed at all.81
Despite Justice Stewart’s overture, the Supreme Court continued
to evade the judicial takings question.82 In 1993, Justice Stewart’s
concurrence in Hughes was affirmatively cited by Justice Scalia
(with Justice O’Connor) in dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach.83 Stevens featured a littoral
property owner that was denied a permit to construct a seawall.84
The Oregon Supreme Court relied on the custom of the public’s right
to beach access as a “background principle[]” under Lucas to uphold
the permit denial.85 Scalia was skeptical of this reasoning, citing the
80
Id. at 295 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Surely it must be conceded as a general proposition that the law of real property is, under our Constitution, left to the
individual States to develop and administer.”).
81
Id. at 296–97 (emphasis added).
82
See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994); Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 331
(1973) (quoting Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Hughes but finding it “unnecessary” to resolve the “serious constitutional issue” posed by judicial takings).
83
See Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Hughes,
389 U.S. at 296–97 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
84
Stevens, 854 P.2d at 451.
85
See id. at 453–57. The Oregon Supreme Court relied on State ex rel.
Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969), where it established that “[t]he custom
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Oregon Supreme Court’s dubious and inconsistent record of defining the custom in similar contexts.86 Scalia seemed to imply that the
Oregon Supreme Court had applied the custom doctrine as a means
to an end for judgment. According to Scalia, “Lucas . . . would be a
nullity if anything that a state court chooses to denominate ‘background law’—regardless of whether it is really such—could eliminate property rights.”87 Despite never being heard by the Court, Stevens had laid the foundation for the Stop the Beach plurality opinion
seventeen years later.
Before hearing Stop the Beach, however, the Supreme Court
heard several other cases involving apparent judicial takings. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins88 featured a group of students excluded from petitioning in a public shopping center.89 The California Supreme Court overturned precedent by holding that the state
constitution required the shopping centers to permit petitioners on
their premises.90 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment,
concluding that no taking occurred because the petitioning did not
unreasonably impair the value or use of the shopping center.91 By
subjecting the California Supreme Court’s judgment to the standard
Penn Central analysis, the Court seemed to dismiss the notion of
any distinction between legislative and judicial takings. Indeed,
Scalia argues as much in Stop the Beach.92
of the people of Oregon to use the dry-sand area of the beaches for public recreational purposes meets every one of Blackstone’s requisites [for establishing a custom]” and that denying beachfront property owners the right to develop the “drysand” portion of their land “takes from no man anything which he has had a legitimate reason to regard as exclusively his.” Thornton, 462 P.2d at 677–78. To be
sure, Thornton poses a judicial takings question in its own right. See Stevens, 510
U.S. at 1212 & nn.4–5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the Oregon Supreme
Court’s application of the custom doctrine); W. David Sarratt, Judicial Takings
and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 1487, 1487–88 (2004) (introducing the
article with a discussion of Thornton).
86
See Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1208–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87
Id. at 1211.
88
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
89
Id. at 77.
90
Id. at 78.
91
Id. at 83.
92
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560
U.S. 702, 714 (2010) (“Our precedents provide no support for the proposition that
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The same year Pruneyard was decided, the Court issued another
opinion, Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,93 implicitly equating legislative and judicial takings. In Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies, the Court reviewed the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of a state statute assigning interest generated from an interpleader fund.94 The Florida Supreme Court had reasoned that because the fund is considered “public money” until it leaves the circuit court’s account, any interest the fund generates belongs to the
county.95 The Court, however, found that in departing from the
“long established general rule” that interest in such accounts is classified as private property,96 the Florida Supreme Court had effected
a taking.97 Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies illustrates that the Court
will not tolerate the judiciary “transform[ing] private property into
public property without compensation.”98 To reinforce this point,
the Court granted certiorari to review the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision in Stop the Beach.99
II.

THE HISTORY OF STOP THE BEACH

A.
The First District Court of Appeal Opinion
In 1995, Hurricane Opal swept through the gulf coast of Florida
and critically eroded beaches along the City of Destin (the “City”)
and Walton County (the “County”).100 The City and County then
takings effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment, and in fact
suggest to the contrary.”).
93
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
94
Id. at 155–56.
95
Id. at 158–59.
96
Id. at 162–63.
97
Id. at 164 (“Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida
courts by judicial decree, may accomplish the result the county seeks simply by
recharacterizing the principal as ‘public money’ because it is held temporarily by
the court.” (emphasis added)). Just as in Pruneyard, the Court analyzed the case
under Penn Central. See id.
98
Id.; see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.,
560 U.S. 702, 714, 715 (2010); RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 12 n.17 (1985).
99
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 712.
100
See Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 50
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Walton County v. Stop the Beach
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initiated a lengthy administrative process to restore the beaches (the
“Project”) that culminated in July 2003 when they filed for a Joint
Coastal Permit.101 A year later, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”) released a notice of intent to
issue the permit.102 Two groups of affected oceanfront property
owners, Save Our Beaches, Inc. and Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc., each petitioned for an administrative hearing to challenge the
Project.103 The property owners disputed ownership of the restored
beach, which the State planned to open to the public.104 In June
2005, the cases were consolidated and heard by the Florida Division
of Administrative Hearings.105 The Department followed the Administrative Board’s recommendation to issue the Joint Coastal permit, and the property owners appealed to the First DCA.106
At issue before the First DCA was whether the Department unconstitutionally applied Florida’s Beach and Shore Preservation Act
(the “Act”).107 Passed in 1961, the Act endorses “beach restoration
and nourishment projects,” whereby sand is deposited and maintained on eroded beaches.108 Once a restoration project is approved,
an erosion control line (the “ECL”) is fixed according to the present

Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach,
560 U.S. 702.
101
Id. The permit proposed dredging sand along the beach to redistribute it in
accordance with a planned design. Id. at 50–51.
102
Id. at 51.
103
Id.
104
See id.; Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1106–07, 1109 (“The State holds the
fore-shore in trust for its people for the purposes of navigation, fishing and bathing.” (quoting White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446, 449 (Fla. 1939))).
105
Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 51; see Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Env’t Prot., DOAH Case Nos. 04-2960/04-3261, 2005 WL 1543209 (Fla. Div.
Admin. Hrgs. Jun. 30, 2005) (recommended order); Save Our Beaches, Inc. v.
Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., DEP Nos. DEP:05-0791/04-1370, 2005 WL 1927305
(Fla. Dep’t Env’t Prot. Jul. 27, 2005) (final order).
106
Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 50. The Department issued a final order
validating the permit in July 2005. Id. at 51. The property owners did not appeal
the Administrative Board’s finding that the project would not adversely affect
water quality standards. Id.
107
Id. at 50; Beach and Shore Preservation Act of 1961, FLA. STAT.
§§ 161.011–.45 (2020).
108
FLA. STAT. § 161.088 (2020); see also FLA. STAT. § 161.021(3)–(4)
(2020).

814

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:798

MHWL.109 This ECL replaces the MHWL as the boundary between
state and private property.110 Significantly, the MHWL (unlike the
ECL) fluctuates with accretion and erosion.111 Thus, when beach
restoration efforts move the MHWL seaward, property owners do
not attain any new land.112 Rather, the state holds title to the new
strip of beach that abuts the ocean.113
After the district court dismissed Save Our Beaches’ appeal for
lack of standing, it proceeded to analyze the littoral rights of the
members of Stop the Beach Renourishment.114 According to the
court’s interpretation of the Florida Constitution, title to littoral
property inheres that such property extends to the MHWL.115 The
court supported this reading by citing several Florida cases that emphasized the importance of this rule.116 The court also pointed out
that the Project would cause the property owners to lose their right
to have their property abut the water.117 The right to ingress and
egress to the ocean—which is preserved by the Act118—did not sufficiently preserve the property owners’ littoral rights.119 Accordingly, in April 2006, the First DCA reversed the Department’s order
109

FLA. STAT. § 161.191(2) (2020).
FLA. STAT. § 161.191(1) (2020).
111
See Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 59.
112
See id.
113
See id.
114
See id. at 56–60. Unlike the 6 individual members of Stop the Beach Renourishment, the 150 members of Save Our Beaches did not all own property in
the Project zone. Id. at 55–56; see also Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1106 n.5 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
115
Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 58 (“The title to lands under navigable
waters, within the boundaries of the state, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state . . . .” (quoting FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 11)).
116
Id. at 58 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v.
Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Bd. Of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512
So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987); Teat v. City of Apalachicola, 738 So. 2d 413, 414
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
117
See Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 60 (“Florida’s law is clear that [littoral]
rights cannot be severed from [littoral] uplands absent an agreement with the [littoral] owner, not even by the power of eminent domain.”).
118
FLA. STAT. § 161.201 (2020).
119
Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 59.
110
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to issue the Joint Coastal Permit,120 and the Department appealed to
the Florida Supreme Court.121
B.
The Florida Supreme Court Opinion
Noting that the district court had certified the takings question
to be of “great public importance,” the Florida Supreme Court
agreed to hear the case two years later.122 The Florida Supreme
Court determined that the case presented a facial challenge to the
Act, and rephrased the issue as follows: “On its face, does the Beach
and Shore Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights without just compensation?”123 Before delving
into its analysis, the court accentuated the State’s property rights.
The court emphasized that Florida has a “constitutional duty to protect [its] beaches, part of which it holds ‘in trust for all the people.’”124
Although the court acknowledged several exclusive littoral
rights, it distinguished the right to accretion as a future interest contingent upon accretion occurring.125 According to the court, however, the beach restoration endorsed by the Act does not constitute
accretion; rather, it is a public remedy to avulsion.126 Under Florida
law, the boundary between state and private property remains the
MHWL before the “avulsive event” occurred.127 Significantly, the
Act dictates that the impact of avulsion on the existing MHWL be

120

Id. at 60.
See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d
1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla.
Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
122
Id. at 1105. The certified question had asked whether the Act was unconstitutionally applied to grant the permit at Stop the Beach Renourishment’s expense. Id.
123
Id. (citations omitted). In dissent, Judge Wells argued that the court should
treat this case as an applied constitutional challenge because the district court
treated it as such. Id. at 1121 (Wells, J., dissenting).
124
Id. at 1110–11 (majority opinion) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11).
125
Id. at 1112.
126
See id. at 1119 (“[T]he common law rule of accretion . . . is not implicated
in the context of this Act.”); id. at 1116 (“The doctrine of avulsion is pivotal because, under that doctrine, the public has the right to reclaim its land lost by an
avulsive event.”).
127
Id. at 1114.
121
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taken into account when delineating the ECL.128 Therefore, on its
face, the Act does not unconstitutionally deprive property owners of
any land they possessed before the avulsive event occurred.129 As
the court acknowledged, however, it is not clear whether the state
took Hurricane Opal into account when delineating the ECL here.130
By restricting its analysis to the facial constitutionality of the Act,
the court dodged this question altogether.
In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the court rejected
the notion of any littoral right to have one’s property abut the water.131 According to the court, such a right is ancillary to the littoral
right of access to the water.132 Therefore, contrary to the district
court’s contentions, the preserved right of ingress and egress to the
ocean did sufficiently preserve the property owners’ littoral
rights.133 This point was vigorously argued in dissent by Justice
Lewis, who proclaimed that “[i]n this State, the legal essence of littoral or riparian land is contact with the water.”134 Lewis explained
that, while the barrier of state land between private land and the water may only be a few yards here, nothing in the majority opinion
restricts the barrier from being “hundreds or even thousands of
yards” in other instances.135 Indeed, the precedent in Florida appears
to be set: Oceanfront property need not extend to the ocean to maintain its littoral status.
C.
The U.S. Supreme Court Opinion
Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to
resolve any issues of Florida property law. The Court, rather,
granted certiorari to determine whether “the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision itself effected a taking of the [Stop the Beach Renourishment] Members’ littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and

128

Id. at 1117.
Id. (“In light of this common law doctrine of avulsion, the provisions of
the Beach and Shore Preservation Act at issue are facially constitutional.”).
130
Id. at 1117 n.15.
131
See id. at 1119.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 1122 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
135
Id. at 1126.
129
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Fourteenth Amendments.”136 Justice Scalia was joined by the entirety of the Court in ruling for the state, but only Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito joined the sections of Scalia’s
opinion addressing judicial takings.137 Justices Kennedy and Breyer
each authored separate concurring opinions to address their stance
on judicial takings.138 Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg joined Kennedy and Breyer respectively in these concurrences.139
1. JUSTICE SCALIA’S PLURALITY OPINION
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the State had not
taken Stop the Beach Renourishment members’ property.140 The
property owners relied on Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Associates, Ltd.,141 which held that
that the artificial nature of an accretion does not alter the littoral right
to accretion in Florida.142 The Court, however, deferred to the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that the Act implicated avulsion,
not accretion.143 In Florida, submerged land seaward of the MHWL
that becomes exposed by an avulsion belongs to the State.144
136

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S.
702, 712 (2010). The Court declined to address the property owners’ other two
claims: (1) the Project—not just the Florida Supreme Court opinion—constituted
a taking; and (2) the Act was a deprivation of property without due process. Id. at
729 n.11; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Stop the Beach, 560 U.S.
702 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
137
Id. at 705. Justice Stevens recused himself because he owns littoral property in Florida. D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U.
RICH. L. REV. 903, 904 (2011).
138
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 733–742 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 742–
45 (Breyer, J., concurring).
139
Id. at 733 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 742 (Breyer, J., concurring).
140
Id. at 733 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141
Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Sand Key Assocs.,
Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1987).
142
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 732 (citing Sand Key, 512 So. 2d at 937–38).
143
See id. at 732. Unlike the Florida Supreme Court, which focused on the
beach loss resulting from Hurricane Opal as the pertinent avulsion, the U.S. Supreme Court characterized the beach restoration efforts as the avulsion warranting
analysis. Accord Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.
2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 116–17 (2010).
144
See Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1116–17 (citing Bryant v. Peppe, 238
So. 2d 836, 838–39 (Fla. 1970)).
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Applying this principle, the Court reasoned that the State is entitled
to land recovered by beach restoration.145 To justify state action
(beach restoration) as a qualifying avulsion, the Court relied on
Martin v. Busch,146 which suggests that artificial avulsions are
treated no differently than natural avulsions in Florida.147 The Court
also rejected the property owners’ claim that the Florida Supreme
Court “took” their right to have their property abut the water.148 After affirming that the right to contact is ancillary to the right to access
in Florida, Scalia offers a sneak peek of the plurality’s new judicial
takings doctrine in action: “One cannot say that the Florida Supreme
Court contravened established property law by rejecting it.”149
Scalia is blunt in his judicial takings analysis.150 Citing cases
such as Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies and Pruneyard, Scalia dismisses any conceivable precedent for the idea that a taking effected
by the judiciary should be treated any differently than a taking effected by the legislature.151 Rather, it is a violation of the Fifth
Amendment for any branch of state government to declare that an
established private property right no longer exists.152 Scalia therefore reasons that a judicial decision can abrogate private property
rights just as state appropriation or regulation can.153 Although
Scalia tries to downplay the significance of this assertion, a potentially groundbreaking new doctrine had just been affirmed by a Supreme Court plurality with shockingly little analysis.154
145

See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 730–31.
Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 287 (Fla. 1927) (holding that state owns
previously submerged land in a lakebed that state owns and drains).
147
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 730–31 (citing Martin, 112 So. 274 at 87–
88).
148
Id. at 732–33.
149
Id. at 733.
150
See id. at 713–15.
151
See id. at 714–15.
152
Id. at 715 (“[T]he Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking . . . . [Th]e particular state actor is irrelevant.”).
153
See id.
154
This is certainly not the first Scalia opinion that fails to clarify a legal standard. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412–13 (2012) (holding that
the warrantless use of a tracking device on a motor vehicle constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment but failing to clarify whether the Court was actually
146
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Rather than discussing the nuances and ramifications of a judicial takings doctrine, Scalia took time to criticize Kennedy and
Breyer.155 Scalia accuses both Justices of the same logical fallacy:
“conclud[ing] that the Florida Supreme Court’s action here does not
meet the standard for a judicial taking, while purporting not to determine what is the standard for a judicial taking, or indeed whether
such a thing as a judicial taking even exists.”156 Clearly, Scalia was
not enamored with the judicial restraint exhibited by the concurring
justices. Kennedy’s push for due process likewise elicits Scalia’s
wrath. Specifically, Scalia denounces Kennedy for overlooking
clear precedent, betraying the Court’s policy of not applying substantive due process to economic rights, misconstruing the framers’
intent, and proposing an illusory substitute for the Takings Clause
without limits to guide the Court.157
Scalia also spends plenty of time on the defensive. Notably,
Scalia labels the procedural obstacles to judicial takings as “nonexistent [and] insignificant.”158 Scalia also systematically and somewhat abrasively dismisses the federalism concerns advanced by the
State, including the federal courts’ knowledge of state law, the common law’s need for flexibility, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s
requirement that lower federal courts not review state court decisions unless specifically authorized by Congress to do so.159 An
overarching theme of criticism directed at a judicial takings doctrine
is that federal courts should not be defining state property rights; yet,
according to Scalia, “the test [the plurality has] adopted . . . contains
within itself a considerable degree of deference to state courts.”160
Justice Breyer was not convinced.

articulating a new test for government trespasses); District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that a D.C. law violated the Second Amendment but refusing to articulate a standard for future challenges to gun regulations).
155
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 719–25.
156
Id. at 719.
157
See id. at 719–25.
158
Id. at 723.
159
See id. at 726–27 (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16
(1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983)).
160
Id. at 726 n.9.
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2. JUSTICE BREYER’S CONCURRENCE
Breyer’s brief concurrence is an archetype of judicial restraint.
Because no judicial taking occurred here, Breyer did not see the
point in validating a judicial takings doctrine.161 Although he stops
short of criticizing the constitutional theory behind the doctrine,
Breyer questions whether federal courts could effectively implement it.162 Breyer accurately adverts that judicial takings claims will
turn on property rights of “considerable complexity” traditionally
left for the states.163 Moreover, the federal courts will be overrun
with takings challenges from nonparties to state court cases who
nevertheless allege they are adversely impacted by that state court’s
decision.164 Breyer also succinctly responds to Scalia’s admonishment of his judicial restraint by reminding the plurality that “courts
frequently find it possible to resolve cases—even those raising constitutional questions—without specifying the precise standard under
which a party wins or loses.”165 Justice Kennedy echoes this sentiment in his concurrence166 but also challenges the merit of the plurality’s judicial takings doctrine while presenting an intriguing alternative in the process.
3. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRENCE
Kennedy’s concurrence strikes a careful balance between critiquing the Takings Clause and promoting the Due Process Clause.
Prognosticating that a judicial takings doctrine would essentially allow the judiciary to exercise the power of eminent domain,167 Kennedy argues that the power to abrogate property rights should be left
161

See id. at 744–45 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In the past, Members of this
Court have warned us that, when faced with difficult constitutional questions, we
should ‘confine ourselves to deciding only what is necessary to the disposition of
the immediate case.’” (quoting Whitehouse v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 349 U.S. 366, 373
(1955))).
162
See id. at 743–44.
163
Id. at 743–44.
164
See id. at 743.
165
Id. at 744.
166
See id. at 733–34 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“As Justice Breyer observes . . . this case does not require the Court to determine whether, or when, a
judicial decision determining the rights of property owners can violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”).
167
See id. at 739.
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to political branches that are qualified to evaluate the necessity and
utility of regulatory action branches.168 Moreover, subjecting the
courts to the Taking Clause may actually encourage judicial
changes in property law: Courts will be confident that new rules will
be upheld as takings (with compensation granted), rather than invalidated under due process.169 Kennedy also expresses apprehension
over the procedure for raising a judicial takings claim and the remedies available.170 May the claim be raised on appeal or in a separate
suit?171 Is compensation to the aggrieved party mandated and, if so,
by the courts or the legislature?172 Kennedy warns the plurality that
by “reach[ing] beyond the necessities of the case to recognize a judicial takings doctrine,” the Court must now resolve these intricate
issues in the future.173
To avoid these issues, Kennedy proposes that the Court rely on
the Due Process Clause to rectify judicial takings. More specifically,
Kennedy contends that federal courts should invalidate state court
decisions that substantially alter or eliminate established property
rights by finding them “arbitrary or irrational” under the Due Process Clause.174 Kennedy reminds the Court that it has a long history
of invalidating property regulation under the Due Process Clause,
which already dissuades and ultimately prevents state courts from
“abandon[ing] settled principles” of the common law.175 Moreover,
assessing whether a judicial decision is “arbitrary or irrational” is no
more difficult than assessing whether a judicial decision has altered

168

See id. at 735 (“[A]s a matter of custom and practice, these [decisions made
in exercising eminent domain] are matters for the political branches—the legislature and the executive—not the courts.”); id. at 736 (“Courts, unlike the executive
or legislature, are not designed to make policy decisions about the ‘need for, and
likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions.’”) (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005))).
169
See id. at 738–39.
170
See id. at 740. Scalia explains that the Court would not mandate compensation if it determined that a judicial taking occurred here. See id. at 723–24 (majority opinion). Rather, it would give the state legislature the choice to pay compensation or decline to complete the Project. See id.
171
See id. at 740 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
172
See id. at 740–41.
173
Id. 741–42.
174
Id. at 737.
175
See id. at 735–738.
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or eliminated an established property right.176 Thus, Kennedy finds
it natural and practicable to apply the Due Process Clause to judicial
takings.177 So does this Article’s author.
III.

COMMENT ON THE DRAWBACKS OF A JUDICIAL TAKINGS
DOCTRINE AND THE BENEFITS OF DUE PROCESS

A.

Procedural Concerns Raised by a Judicial Takings
Doctrine
The greatest problem with the judicial takings doctrine proposed
in Stop the Beach is that it is not clear how it will overcome the
procedural hurdles it faces. Although Stop the Beach involved a
state actor and a private party, other disputes between private litigants may also raise the judicial takings question. Take a hypothetical instance of adverse possession. If a state supreme court radically
alters the common law by holding that X has acquired ownership of
a tract on Y’s property through adverse possession, it would seem to
have declared that Y’s clearly established property right no longer
exists. According to Scalia, Y’s only option to raise a judicial taking
claim is through petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court.178 However, suppose that numerous other landowners (“L”)
in the state now face similar claims from their own adverse possessors (“A”), or are concerned that the state court’s ruling terminated
their property rights. Several difficult questions arise.
Has the door to federal court been opened for L to file a judicial
takings claim? Scalia suggests as much, equating a judicial takings
claim to any other takings claim.179 Until recently, however, the
door to federal court for takings claims remained nearly closed. As
176

See id. at 737 (“The objection that a due process claim might involve close
questions concerning whether a judicial decree extends beyond what owners
might have expected is not a sound argument; for the same close questions would
arise to whether a judicial decision is a taking.”).
177
Id. at 736 (“It is thus natural to read the Due Process Clause as limiting the
power of courts to eliminate or change established property rights.”).
178
See id. at 727 (majority opinion).
179
See id. at 728 (“[W]here the claimant was not a party to the original suit,
he would be able to challenge in federal court the [judicial] taking effected by the
state supreme-court opinion to the same extent that he would be able to challenge
[a legislative or executive taking] in federal court . . . .”).
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the U.S. Supreme Court stated in the 2005 case San Remo Hotel,
L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco,180 “there is scant precedent
for the litigation in federal district court of claims that a state agency
has taken property in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause.”181 San Remo Hotel upheld Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,182 which
held that a federal takings claim is not ripe until the state fails to
provide adequate compensation.183 Additionally, San Remo Hotel
affirmed that the Full Faith and Credit Clause bars federal re-litigation of whether “just compensation” ought to be provided.184
However, in the 2019 case Knick v. Township of Scott,185 a
sharply divided Supreme Court overruled the state-litigation requirement of Williamson County in a five to four decision.186 Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts explained that, “[c]ontrary to
Williamson County, a property owner has a claim for a violation of
the Takings Clause as soon as a government takes his property for
public use without paying for it.”187 Roberts surmised that Williamson County would have a different outcome if the Court foresaw the
“preclusion trap . . . sprung by San Remo Hotel.”188 Writing for the
dissent, Justice Kagan defended Williamson County as unremarkable and consistent with stare decisis.189 More pertinent here, Kagan
warned that “[t]oday’s decision sends a flood of complex state-law
issues to federal courts . . . . It betrays judicial federalism.”190
Notwithstanding Justice Kagan’s (justifiable) judicial federalism concerns, federal courts are a better forum to hear L’s and
180

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
Id. at 347.
182
Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172 (1985).
183
See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 345–48; Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195
(“[T]he State’s action is not ‘complete’ in the sense of causing a constitutional
injury ‘unless or until the state fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss.’” (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12
(1984))).
184
See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 345–48.
185
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
186
See id. at 2167–68.
187
Id. at 2170.
188
Id. at 2174.
189
See id. at 2183 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
190
Id. at 2188–89.
181
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others’ judicial takings claims. Simply put, state courts are not positioned to adequately address judicial takings claims. To illustrate,
L’s judicial takings claim would need to be filed with or certified to
the state supreme court because a lower state court is institutionally
incapable of classifying the state supreme court’s judgment for X as
a taking. Yet, it seems highly unlikely that the state supreme court
would overrule itself by retrospectively determining that its judgment for X was a taking.191 Indeed, higher state courts may also be
reluctant to find that lower courts committed judicial takings; such
judgments could bring negative attention and embarrassment to the
judiciary. In sum, state supreme and appellate courts would be
bogged down by numerous judicial takings claims, many of which
would conceivably be dismissed out of principle. Thus, it seems inefficient for non-party claimants such as L to litigate judicial takings
claims in state court.192 Accordingly, the Stop the Beach plurality
should have expounded upon the proper forum for non-party claimants to file judicial takings claims—perhaps vesting exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts.
The Fifth Amendment only provides for compensation to be
awarded to aggrieved parties.193 Thus, should L prevail on his judicial takings claim, A would seemingly be entitled to stay on L’s
property so long as L is compensated accordingly (or until L wins a
separate action to oust A). Nothing in the Fifth Amendment, however, authorizes private parties to pay compensation or the state to
compensate for land use that does not further a public purpose. Thus,
L would appear to be without a remedy for the “judicial taking” of
his property. Even if A leaves after judgment for L is entered, a
191

Compare Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 585–86 (D. Haw. 1977),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 753 F. 2d 1468, 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated mem.
477 U.S. 902 (1986), with Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P. 2d 287, 294–300 (Haw.
1982) (Hawaii State Supreme Court responds to certified questions issued by
Ninth Circuit with self-serving answers that ultimately insulated its prior decision
from constitutional challenge).
192
Of course, the federal courts (including the U.S. Supreme Court) face their
own efficiency concerns in supplementing their dockets with judicial takings
claims. These concerns would obviously be buttressed if the federal courts were
granted exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.
193
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005) (emphasizing
that the Takings Clause’s focus is on providing just compensation for interference
with property rights, not restricting the nature of such interference).

2021]

THE DAWN OF A JUDICIAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE

825

temporary taking would seem to have occurred in the interim.194 In
theory, L would be entitled to compensation for A’s period of adverse possession between judgment for X and judgment for L. There
is another wrinkle: Suppose that Y had a petition for rehearing denied by the state supreme court and a petition for writ of certiorari
denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. Even if the federal court rules
for L, there is now no apparent remedy for Y, who was not a party
to L’s suit. Not only have Y’s procedural due process rights seemingly been violated,195 res judicata would seem to bar Y from bringing a subsequent claim against X.196
To be clear, the foregoing procedural concerns are speculative.
As judicial takings questions continue to pervade in light of Stop the
Beach, the Supreme Court will hopefully provide more lucid guidance on how and by whom judicial takings may be alleged. The
Court’s pre-existing takings jurisprudence does offer some doctrinal
tools for courts to narrow the scope of judicial takings in practice.
Indeed, a court could conceivably bar L’s judicial takings claim by
holding that adverse possession is governed by “background principles” of state property law and thus the state supreme court’s judgment for X does not warrant compensation for aggrieved parties under the Takings Clause. Nevertheless, the Court missed a golden
194

An adverse possessor has physically invaded the landowner’s property,
which is a per se taking, even though only a portion of the land was invaded temporarily. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
436–37 (1982) (finding that constitutional takings protections do not depend on
the size of the area physically occupied); First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987) (finding that
abandonment of a taking still requires compensation for the period during which
the regulation that constitutes the taking was in effect).
195
See Sotomura v. Cnty. of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 482–83 (D. Haw.
1978) (holding that the Hawaii Supreme Court violated procedural due process
when it denied petition for rehearing after introducing property ownership into
litigation). Like most other procedural complexities posed by a judicial takings
doctrine, procedural due process concerns were not addressed in Stop the Beach.
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S.
702, 729 n.11 (2010).
196
This assertion mirrors the plurality’s position in Stop the Beach. See Stop
the Beach 560 U.S. at 727–28 (“If certiorari were denied . . . the matter would be
res judicata.”). Justice Kennedy disagrees. Id. at 740 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[U]ntil the state court in Case A changes the law, the party will not know if his
or her property rights will have been eliminated. So res judicata probably would
not bar the party from litigating the takings issue in Case B.”).
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opportunity to solidify the boundaries for judicial takings in Stop the
Beach.
B.
The State Courts’ Need for Flexibility
Perhaps the most popular objection to a judicial takings doctrine
rests upon federalism grounds.197 As the State argues in Stop the
Beach, “[f]ederal courts should not involve themselves in and second-guess the evolution of state common law, which can vary
widely from state to state.”198 This quote illustrates two important
points: (1) the common law, by its very nature, changes over time;
and (2) property law is not uniform amongst the states. These principles advocate against granting federal judges the power to define
property interests—a power traditionally reserved to the states.199
The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized “the ‘great respect’ that
[it] owe[s] to state legislatures and state courts in discerning local
197

See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 61, at 1509 (“Indeed, the most frequently
heard objection [to a judicial takings doctrine] is that the development and specification of property law is a matter for the state courts, and that federal courts
should not interfere with this process through assertion of the takings protections.”); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 305
(1993) (“[G]iving federal judges the last word on questions of the meanings of
laws emanating from state authorities . . . seems to be a gross contravention of
Our Federalism.”); John Martinez, Taking Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional Right to be Free from “Startling” State Court Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 297, 332–33 (1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court should not
interfere with a state court’s “fundamental social choice” to adjust law to “evolving social reality”).
198
Brief of Respondents, Florida Department of Environmental Protection &
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund at 58, Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010) (No. 081151); see also Brief for Respondents Walton County & City of Destin at 28, Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010)
(No. 08-1151) (“Wide variations exist among the States in their understanding of
property rights associated with riparian lands. State courts will be more attuned to
these differences, and have a comparative advantage relative to federal courts in
explicating their own property systems.” (citations omitted)).
199
See, e.g., Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 707 (“Generally speaking, state law
defines property interests . . . .”); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972) (“Property interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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public needs.”200 Unlike the federal courts, state courts are designed
to implement changes in the law for the welfare of their respective
communities. It follows that state courts have an intrinsic advantage
in interpreting its own property law, and—contrary to Scalia’s assertions—do have a “peculiar need of flexibility.”201 This is particularly true for property rights incorporated into legal areas where the
Federal Government offers little guidance, such as family and probate law.202
Suppose, for example, that a state supreme court contravenes
settled common law by adopting the approach endorsed by Uniform
Probate Code (the “UPC”) §2-802, which bars divorcees from receiving the life insurance premium from their deceased former
spouse.203 Consequently, local divorcees are abruptly deprived of a
seemingly “clearly established property interest”204 in their deceased
former spouse’s life insurance—a radical yet conceivable judicial
takings claim. Although the financial impact on affected divorcees
could be substantial, the state supreme court’s judgment may lie in
well-grounded policy concerns.205 Perhaps a large increase in the
200

See CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW, supra note 27, at 306 (emphasis
added) (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005)); see also
Brinkerhoff-Faris Tr. & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930) (“[T]he courts
of a State have the supreme power to interpret and declare the written and unwritten laws of the State . . . .”).
201
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 727.
202
See generally Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature:
Understanding Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1446–49
(1933) (discussing how states have continuously changed property laws in response to economic and social changes).
203
See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-802 (amended 2019) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020).
In the absence of clear legislation, courts have been willing to follow and even
expressly “adopt” UPC provisions. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thompson, 423 N.E.
2d 90, 94 (Ohio 1981) (“As a result, we adopt these specific [UPC] sections as the
law of this state.”); In re Estate of Safran, 306 N.W. 2d 27, 32 (Wis. 1981) (relying
on provisions of the UPC and noting that several states have adopted the UPC);
California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 515 F. Supp. 524, 532 (E.D.
La. 1981). See generally Roger W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in Nonadopting States, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599, 609–12 (1985)
(discussing how UPC has been used by various courts in jurisdictions where UPC
has not been formally adopted).
204
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 725.
205
See generally Andersen, supra note 203, at 609–12 (describing where
judges have relied on UPC § 2-802 to address policy issues).
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divorce rate has resulted in numerous lawsuits where divorcees are
receiving substantial portions of their deceased former spouse’s estate at the expense of their deceased former spouse’s new family.
Accordingly, the court adapted the UPC provision in conformance
with its policy of honoring the testator’s intent.206 If a judicial takings doctrine came to fruition, however, the court might be reluctant
to take such action since it could be construed as a taking. Consequently, the apposite UPC provision would need to negotiate the
legislative process.207 Meanwhile, divorcees would continue to
profit off their deceased former spouses until a law is finally passed.
This scenario is hard to justify on efficiency or moral grounds, especially to second families of decedents.
Like inheritance rights, littoral rights vary from state to state.208
Consider the foreshore at issue in Stop the Beach. Florida holds its
foreshores in trust for the public,209 but Maine and Massachusetts
restrict public use along the foreshore of private littoral property.210
Contrarily, public use rights extend to the vegetation line in Hawaii
and Texas.211 Each state has its own, unique reasons for adapting
these laws.212 Federal courts are not privy to these reasons. Indeed,
as Scalia admits, federal courts are not free to explore the policy

206

Presumably, a testator would prefer that his new family inherit contested
assets of his estate over his former spouse.
207
See Overview, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
aboutulc/overview (last visited May 15, 2021) (“[N]o uniform law is effective
until the state legislature adopts it.”).
208
Brief for Respondents Walton County & City of Destin, supra note 198, at
16; see also United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,
702–03 (1899) (“[A]s to every stream within its dominion, a State may change
[the] common law rule and permit the appropriation of the flowing waters for such
purposes as it deems wise.”).
209
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S.
702, 707 (2010) (first citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; and then citing Broward v.
Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 407–409 (1909)).
210
See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 169 (Me. 1989); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Mass. 1974).
211
See Diamond v. State, 145 P.3d 704, 712 (Haw. 2006); TEX. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. § 61.011(a) (West 2019).
212
See, e.g., Diamond, 145 P.3d at 716 (“[T]he [state] legislature’s intent
[was] to reserve as much of the shore as possible to the public”).
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behind established property rights.213 Yet, this is exactly what federal courts would be doing in assessing judicial takings claims.
Although federal courts must apply the property law of different
states in traditional takings contexts,214 the focus is on whether a
regulation’s effect upon property rights mandates compensation, not
the extent to which the regulation alters the law.215 In other words,
judicial takings actually require a judge to assess the precedent for
the “state action” (or the judge’s decision), rather than simply its end
result. Of course, the merit of a judge’s reasoning may not be measured under the firm, universal standards that govern traditional takings (e.g., physical invasion is a per se taking, parcel is viewed as a
whole, etc.). Therefore, in applying a judicial takings doctrine, federal courts would have little guidance in embarking on ad hoc inquiries into diverse and complex areas of state law.
“Background Principles” of State Law
C.
Proponents of a judicial takings doctrine counter federalism arguments by denoting state court abuse of the “background principles” enunciated in Lucas.216 By examining the extent of a claimant’s title instead of the regulation’s impact on property rights,

213

See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 732.
As an example, Scalia identifies the “background principles” of state property law federal courts must apply in determining whether a parcel has been deprived of all economically beneficial use. See id. at 726–27 (citing Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)).
215
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005) (“[T]he
Takings Clause ‘does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places
a condition on the exercise of that power.’ In other words, it ‘is designed not to
limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.’” (quoting First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1982))).
216
See, e.g., David W. Saratt, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90
VA. L. REV. 1487, 1490–95 (2004) (“[T]he Lucas rule’s background-principles
exception invites state courts to reshuffle property rights in ways that state legislatures cannot, potentially allowing the state to avoid paying compensation for
takings of property.”); Walston, supra note 33, at 423–25 (explaining that Lucas’s
“background principles” present issues in the context of judicial takings); David
J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1442–46 (1996) (discussing how state courts
have used custom to circumvent takings protections).
214
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courts avoid the just compensation question.217 In such a circumstance, courts typically act in accordance with the legislature’s directive; indeed, courts often rely on historical policy to uphold a
statute or other official declaration.218 However, the legislature may
be unable or unwilling to pass a regulation directly and look to judicial enforcement as an alternative. For example, the legislature may
authorize private conservation groups to bring nuisance suits against
private property owners on behalf of the public welfare.219 The judiciary can then classify such nuisances as background principles of
state property law to justify the termination of the source property
interests.
Flexible legal doctrines such as custom and the public trust doctrine permit state courts to advance background principles of their
jurisdictions’ property law. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Ass’n,220 a New Jersey Supreme Court case, provides a particularly
vivid example of the power of the public trust doctrine. Matthews
centered around the public’s access to the area between the MHWL
and the vegetation line of private littoral property.221 New Jersey
precedent appeared to indicate that the public’s interest in this area
was contingent on it being municipally owned.222 Nevertheless, the
court—noting that the “dynamic” public trust doctrine is not “fixed
or static” and may “be molded [or] extended”—held that even private dry sand area must remain accessible and usable by the public

217

See Saratt, supra note 216, at 1491–92.
See supra Part I.C.; supra note 79 (discussing Oregon Supreme Court’s use
of custom); see also supra page 20 (quoting the Florida Supreme Court’s reference to the public trust in Stop the Beach); Crane Neck Ass’n, Inc. v. N.Y.C./Long
Island Cnty. Servs. Grp., 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (N.Y. 1984) (finding that “longstanding public policy” favoring community residences for the mentally handicapped prevents enforcement of a restrictive covenant against such a residence);
Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cnty. Plan. Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1268
(Haw. 1995) (denying shoreline development permit because private development rights are subject to preexisting Native Hawaiian gathering rights).
219
See, e.g., Saratt, supra note 216, at 1492 (providing a hypothetical twist of
the facts in Lucas); Thompson, supra note 61, at 1507 (discussing laws passed in
Oregon and Texas encouraging public lawsuits for greater beach access).
220
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
221
See id. at 358, 358 n.1.
222
See id. at 363.
218
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to ensure reasonable enjoyment of the beach.223 In so holding, the
Court arguably deprived New Jersey’s private littoral owners of the
biggest stick in their bundle of property rights: the right to exclude.224
The outcome of Matthews certainly might have been different if
the New Jersey Supreme Court felt threatened by the prospect of
committing a judicial taking. Consequently, if an established judicial takings doctrine were in place, the New Jersey public might not
be permitted to enjoy the beaches (adjoining private land) that it
does today. Although private littoral property rights would be preserved in this instance, legitimate utilitarian questions would arise.
Public beaches serve as a socializing institution with scale returns.225
Thus, private owners hinder a community’s development by keeping
the public from civilizing and socializing at perceived, customary
recreational sites (e.g., beaches).226 Whereas in Matthews, the public
demand for access to a recreational site increases,227 the state has a
duty to explore accommodating this demand. The Matthews court
met this duty by effectively balancing the public and private property interests at stake: Public use of privately-owned dry sand is restricted to that which is reasonably necessary and remains subject
to the littoral rights of private owners.228 A judicial takings doctrine
223

Id. at 365 (quoting Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-theSea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972)).
224
See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing the right to exclude others as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property”); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
225
Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial
Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627, 644 (1989) (citing Carol
Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 779 (1986)).
226
See Rose, supra note 225, at 779–80.
227
Matthews, 471 at 364–65.
228
Id. The Matthews Court clarified that the public’s right to access/use depends on the beach at issue. See id. Pertinent circumstances include the proximity
of the contested area to the foreshore, any publicly owned beach in the area, the
nature and extent of public demand, and the upland usage of the private owner.
Id. The Court also suggested that the public’s right to reasonable access is
grounded in the law of nuisance. See id. at 364 (“Judge Best would have held on
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would frustrate such compromises between public and private interests, espousing private property rights at the public’s expense.
Background principles give courts an easy out, but they also promote the public welfare. The Supreme Court ought to remind state
courts that Lucas does not give them a green light to reinvent property law. A judicial takings doctrine, however, is not the way to go
about this. The plurality’s judicial takings doctrine threatens courts’
ability to advance “customary [public property] rights[,] [which]
promote strong economic and social utilities.”229 Public property interests must conform to private property interests, but they should
not yield to them outright.
D.

Prospective Views of Takings Scholars on a Judicial
Takings Doctrine
With such little authority (and commentary) available on judicial
takings, it is helpful to speculate how some leading takings scholars
would receive the doctrine announced in Stop the Beach. One such
scholar is Joseph Sax. Sax proposes a rule where a taking only occurs when the government acts as an “enterprise” or acquires resources for its own accord.230 When the government acts as an “arbiter” or mediates disputes between different citizens or groups in
society, no compensation should be required.231 Although Sax reasons that the Takings Clause does not apply to the courts anyway,232
it is hard to discern a clearer instance of the government acting as an
arbiter than when it acts through the judiciary. A judge does not act
with the objective of gaining anything; rather, a judge balances the
interests between two sides.233 Even when the judiciary radically
principles of public policy ‘that the interruption of free access to the sea is a public
nuisance.’” (quoting Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & Ald. 268, 287 (K.B. 1821))).
For an interesting discussion on how nuisance law protects public beach access,
see Finnell, supra note 225, at 646–50.
229
Bederman, supra note 216, at 1454.
230
See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63
(1964).
231
See id.
232
See id. at 51 (“[W]hatever it is that the compensation clause is preventing,
it is something other than the destruction of established economic values. Changes
in the common law are frequently made . . . yet we invariably deny compensation
on the ground that there was no property interest . . . .”).
233
See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
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alters property law to rule for the state, it does not “create[] and define[] the [resources] need[ed]”234 for the state objective—the legislature does.
Consider Stop the Beach. The local governments of the City of
Destin and Walton County decided they needed to restore their
beaches and acted.235 The local governments—not the Court—determined the commodity needed (beach), where it was needed
(along the shore of the City and the County), what amounts it needed
(the total amount of sand deposited from the ebb shoal borrow in
Okaloosa County), and what times it needed it (after Hurricane Opal
hit in 1995).236 As in any other takings case, the Court simply decided whether the State could lawfully carry out this initiative without providing compensation.237
Of course, by serving as the arbiter in takings disputes, society
relies on the judiciary to honor its proprietary expectations. When
people disapprove of the process by which the government interferes with these expectations, demoralization costs are incurred.238
Famous takings critic Frank Michelman postulates that a taking occurs when these demoralizations costs exceed the settlement costs
of paying compensation.239 Reasoning that U.S. takings jurisprudence is inherently flawed,240 Michelman advocates for a self234

See Sax, supra note 230, at 64.
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560
U.S. 702, 711 (2010). As a side note, it does not appear that the local governments
acted as an “enterprise” in Stop the Beach. See supra note 230 and accompanying
text. The Project was ordered as a remedial measure in the wake of Hurricane
Opal. See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 711. The State did not actually acquire land
from the property owners but used sand dredged elsewhere to restore its own submerged land for the public’s benefit. Id. One can argue that the local governments
acted as an “arbiter” between the property owners and the public. See supra note
231 and accompanying text.
236
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 711; Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t
of Env’t Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 50–51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d sub nom.
Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla.
2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. 702.
237
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 733.
238
See Thompson, supra note 61, at 1480–81.
239
Michelman, supra note 54, at 1214–15.
240
See id. at 1250 (“It is rather to suggest the abandonment of any idea that
courts can or will decide each compensability case directly in accordance with the
precept of fairness.”).
235
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regulatory system whereby the aforementioned takings formula is
“built directly into the system of political decision making” (as opposed to a judicial doctrine).241 Thus, Michelman would appear to
reject a judicial takings doctrine by default.
Moreover, Michelman probably would not deem the demoralization costs arising from judicial takings worthy of compensation
anyway. After all, Americans trust the judicial process.242 The courthouse is a beacon of fairness in a community; judges are the nation’s
greatest advocates of justice.243 The judiciary is sequestered from
many of the political pressures facing other branches of government,
particularly ex parte lobbying.244 By nature, a trial is a public operation245 restricted by the dispute at-hand.246 The outcome of the trial,
of course, is subject to an appellate process that should in theory
amend any fallacious decisions.247 It follows that people do not tend
to question the process by which judges arrive at their conclusions—
at least from the outside looking in. Consequently, judicial decisions
do not generally give rise to significant demoralization costs.
Again, consider Stop the Beach. Presumably, most littoral property owners in Florida trust the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment.
241

Id. at 1245 (emphasis added).
See Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in Judicial Branch Up, Executive Branch
Down, GALLUP (Sept. 20, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/219674/trust-judicial-branch-executive-branch-down.aspx (“Americans place the greatest faith in
the judicial branch and the least in the legislative branch.”); Thomas J. Leeper,
Do you Trust the Supreme Court?, PSYCH. TODAY (Mar. 30, 2012),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/polarized/201203/do-you-trust-thesupreme-court (discussing why Americans trust the U.S. Supreme Court).
243
See William K. Weisenberg, Why Our Judges and Courts Are Important,
ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/why_our_judges_and_courts_are_important.
244
See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
245
See Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) (“It is desirable that the
trial of causes should take place under the public eye . . . because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should always act under the sense
of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself
with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.”).
246
See How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, Civil and Criminal Cases, ABA
(Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/cases/.
247
See How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, Appeals, ABA (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/appeals/.
242
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Most likely, the majority of these property owners did not go to law
school and feel unqualified to question the Court’s logic. Perhaps
some property owners thought they had an absolute right to have
their property abut the water before the decision, but now, they just
feel misinformed. To be clear, the pertinent question is not whether
the property owners are disappointed with the judgment itself. Rather, it is whether the property owners are satisfied with the process
by which the judgment was reached. Surely, any remaining doubts
the property owners had regarding the fairness of the legal process
were assuaged when the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and
unanimously affirmed the judgment.
This is not to say that the public’s trust in the judiciary is absolute. To the contrary, the backlash to the U.S. Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Kelo v. City of New London248 illustrates the
disdain people may have for courts that facilitate radical exercises
of eminent domain.249 Indeed, the U.S. House of Representatives
actually passed a resolution formally condemning the decision in
Kelo.250 One outraged citizen even went so far as to formally propose that a hotel be built on the property of Justice Souter, who
joined in the majority opinion.251
248
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In Kelo, the Court approved a condemnation of private residential property so that the land could be
transferred to Pfizer pharmaceutical corporation to further economic development
in the area. See id. at 473–475, 489.
249
See, e.g., Carol L. Zeiner, Establishing a Leasehold Through Eminent Domain: A Slippery Slope Made More Treacherous by Kelo, 56 CATH. U. L. REV.
503, 509, 544–545 (2007); Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City
of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 495–98 (2006); Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, Note, In
the Name of Economic Development: Reviving “Public Use” as a Limitation on
the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London, 54
DRAKE L. REV. 171, 227–28 (2005); Peter M. Agnetti, Comment, Are You Still
Master of Your Domain? Abuses of Economic Development Takings, and Michigan’s Return to “Public Use” in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 79 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1259, 1266 (2005).
250
See H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted); see also Alex Hornaday,
Note, Imminently Eminent: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Takings Since Kelo v.
City of New London, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1619, 1632–38 (discussing various
state legislatures’ reactions to Kelo).
251
Opinion, They Paved Paradise, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2005, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112008935423373523. The outraged citizen
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Kelo illustrates how an unpopular decision can spark immediate
public outcry, but less publicized cases also generate more subtle
demoralization costs over time. As one commentator points out,
“broad” shifts in property law may portray the judiciary as a systematic threat to property rights.252 Take a relatively recent case,
Fancher v. Fagella,253 where the Virginia Supreme Court overturned seventy years of precedent in holding that property owners
may sue their neighbors to cut down invasive trees/roots under nuisance theory.254 The decision was grounded in policy recognizing
Virginia’s transformation from a more rural state to a suburban
one.255 While this decision may have appeased suburban owners, it
probably did not sit well with many rural owners. Such rural owners
now must now worry whether their seemingly innocuous flora suscept them to legal liability. This psychological trepidation may linger for years and ultimately manifest as tangible losses (e.g., surveying land, hiring counsel, and even lowering home prices). Perhaps
most significantly, rural owners may fear that Fancher represents a
systematic judicial trend towards facilitating suburban development
at the expense of their own private property rights.
The motivations of the judiciary are also subject to skepticism at
a much more troubling level. It is not uncommon for a judge to have
a personal stake in the outcome of a case to which they are appointed;256 judicial collusion with interested parties—government
or otherwise—is a plausible concern. Internal policing mechanisms,
however, prevent these concerns from translating into heavy
claimed that the New Hampshire city where Justice Souter resides “will certainly
gain greater tax revenue and economic benefits with a hotel on [the land] than
allowing Mr. Souter to own the land.” Id. The proposed project—the “Lost Liberty Hotel”—was eventually defeated at the polls. Sara Morrison, The Supreme
Court Decision that Threatened Justices’ Own Homes, BOSTON.COM (June 29,
2015), https://www.boston.com/news/national-news/2015/06/29/the-supremecourt-decision-that-threatened-justices-own-homes.
252
Thompson, supra note 61, at 1479–1480.
253
Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519 (Va. 2007).
254
See id. at 520, 523.
255
See id. at 521.
256
See, e.g., Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson & Madison Alder, It’s Barret’s
Call Which Cases She’d Sit out: Recusal Explained (2), BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13,
2020, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/its-barretts-callwhich-cases-shed-sit-out-recusal-explained (discussing the process for recusal in
U.S. Supreme Court Cases).
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demoralization costs.257 Before a judge is elected or appointed, his
character and background is closely scrutinized.258 Moreover,
judges regularly undergo meritocratic examinations and are only
promoted if their decisions conform to standard practice.259 A judge
whose impartiality may be compromised is bound by the Due Process Clause to recuse himself.260 Indeed, if a judge is caught selfdealing, he faces impeachment or even ex-post criminal prosecution.261 For an example of these internal mechanisms at work, one
need look no further than Stop the Beach, where Justice Stevens
recused himself because he owned oceanfront property in Florida.262
Venerable actions like this keep the demoralization costs arising
from judicial decision-making relatively low—certainly below
whatever the settlement costs of incorporating a judicial takings
doctrine (e.g., assessing, negotiating and issuing appropriate compensation) would be.
Unlike Michelman, fellow takings scholar Bruce Ackerman proposes a rule that focuses on how the result of the judgment is perceived. Ackerman offers a simple solution to the takings conundrum: Would an ordinary layman consider it a “bad joke” to say that
his property is left with something of value in light of government
regulation?263 Ackerman does not clarify the threshold for a “bad
joke,” but common sense dictates that the remaining property value
ought to be negligible. A judicial taking could conceivably result in
such extensive property loss, but Stop the Beach and the other
257
See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“A
judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office
fairly and impartially.”).
258
See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43762, THE
APPOINTMENT PROCESS FOR U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS:
AN OVERVIEW 13–14 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43762.pdf.
259
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 186
(1977).
260
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009); Concrete
Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S.
602, 617 (1993) (“[D]ue process requires a neutral and detached judge in the first
instance.” (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972))).
261
See Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or
Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 329 (2012) (discussing judicial selfdealing and providing accordant background sources).
262
See supra note 137.
263
ACKERMAN, supra note 259, at 142.
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preeminent judicial takings cases do not proffer such a circumstance.
The affected littoral property owners in Stop the Beach, Hughes,
Stevens, and Matthews all retained their homes and right to enjoy
the adjacent beach.264 Although property values might have decreased from increased public presence along the beach, the properties were certainly not relegated to a “bad joke.” Indeed, in the case
of Stop the Beach, the completed Project could actually make the
community a more attractive place to live.265 Therefore, littoral
property values in Destin and Walton County may actually increase
over time.266 Pruneyard offers a different context to measure the dichotomy between judicial takings and Ackerman’s test. Although
the California shopping mall owners lost the right to exclude petitioners, the value of their shopping malls was not substantially impaired at all.267 Considering his test’s poor bearing with these cases,
and his support for a judiciary that is innovative and policydriven,268 Ackerman—like Sax and Michelman—would likely dispute the utility of the plurality’s judicial takings doctrine.
E.
In Favor of Due Process
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, the judicial takings doctrine offered by the Stop the Beach plurality presents many practical
and policy concerns. Fortunately, the doctrine did not receive a majority endorsement.269 Moreover, Scalia did not explain the intricacies and scope of the doctrine in any depth.270 It follows that the
264

See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560
U.S. 730, 732–33 (2010); Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 293–94 (1967);
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 460 (Ore. 1993); Matthews v.
Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 369 (N.J. 1984).
265
In addition to increased recreational and aesthetic value, beach restoration
helps protect littoral property from beach erosion. Why Beach Restoration, FLA.
DEP’T ENV’T PROT. (Sept. 18, 2020, 2:24 PM), https://floridadep.gov/rcp/beaches-funding-program/content/why-beach-restoration.
266
See Louis Jacobson, Beach Ruling Cheers Locals, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jun.
18, 2010), https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2010/06/18/beach-ruling-cheerslocals/.
267
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
268
See ACKERMAN, supra note 259, at 38, 188–89.
269
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 707.
270
See supra Part II.C.1.
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Court should face continued pressure to address the judicial takings
conundrum. Accordingly, the Court should have plenty of opportunities to revisit Stop the Beach and explore alternatives to a judicial
takings doctrine—the most sensible of which is the Due Process
Clause.
As Justice Kennedy attests in his concurrence, invalidating property regulation under the Due Process Clause is not a foreign concept.271 Scalia, however, expresses skepticism over how the Due
Process Clause can be construed to limit the power of courts to alter
or eliminate established property rights.272 Contending that Kennedy’s proposal “places no constraints whatever upon this Court,”
Scalia implies that the Due Process Clause’s application to judicial
takings would essentially be illusory.273 Scalia’s utter disdain for due
process in the judicial takings context is puzzling, as determining
whether a judicial decision abruptly eliminated property rights requires similar deductions to deciding whether a judicial decision is
arbitrary or irrational. Both tests require a court to consider what
constitutes a clearly established property right in order to gauge proprietary expectations.274 Courts then must view judicial interference
with these expectations in the context of that state’s property law.
Although federalism concerns are raised whenever federal
courts make judgments affecting state property law, the Due Process
Clause maintains the status quo. The Due Process Clause—which is
inherently broader than the Takings Clause—requires all branches
of government to follow basic standards of reasonableness and fairness.275 It follows that courts already understand that due process
271

Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 735 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court
has long recognized that property regulations can be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause.”). In addition to the examples Kennedy cites here, see supra notes
21–23; see also Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985)
(finding that continued enrollment in college is a protected property interest); Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 199 (1979) (employment contract
is a protected property interest). But cf. Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Ill., 852 F.2d
951, 957 (7th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply substantive due process to expropriation); Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287, 1293–94 (5th Cir. 1986) (refusing to
apply substantive due process to a biased tribunal).
272
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 719 (plurality opinion).
273
Id. at 724 (“[E]ven a firm commitment to apply [substantive due process]
would be a firm commitment to nothing in particular.”).
274
See id. at 715; id. at 737 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
275
Walston, supra note 33, at 435.

840

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:798

prevents them from abandoning settled principles.276 Because it is
universally understood that state courts interpret the law to adapt to
social norms and realities,277 state courts only abandon settled principles when they make truly irrational or arbitrary decisions.278 This
is a much higher standard than the plurality’s judicial takings doctrine.279 Take the example above where a court “adapts” the UPC
provision barring divorcee non-probate inheritance.280 The court
may have terminated a property right, but it also made a prudent
decision that surely is not arbitrary or irrational. Consequently, due
process challenges to the decision would be fruitless. The take-away
here is that much fewer judicial takings claims would have merit
under the Due Process Clause than the Takings Clause. Thus, under
due process analysis, federal courts would not be asked to interpret
and define state property law nearly as often.
In addition to filtering frivolous claims, the Due Process Clause
bypasses the procedural issues associated with takings claims.281 As
discussed above, forum availability for takings claims has historically vexed the U.S. Supreme Court.282 Even following Knick, the
story of where takings claims are filed and how they are resolved
under this new jurisprudence is yet to be written. A judicial takings
doctrine would “invite a host of federal takings claims without the
mature consideration of potential procedural or substantive legal
principles.”283 Due process claims—which may generally be
brought in state or federal court and offer the sole remedy of
276

Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 738 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See Martinez, supra note 197, at 332–33; Walston, supra note 33, at 429
(“The process of trial and error, of change of decision in order to conform with
changing ideas and conditions, is traditional with courts administering the common law.”); Joseph L. Sax, Some Unorthodox Thoughts About Rising Sea Levels,
Beach Erosion, and Property Rights, 11 VT. J. ENV’T L. 641, 645 (2010) (“Traditional common law rules do not fit contemporary circumstances.”).
278
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 736–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
279
See id. at 715 (majority opinion).
280
See supra notes 203–207 and accompanying text.
281
See supra Part III.A.; see also Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings
Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 738 (2002) (commenting on indeterminate nature of
regulatory takings); Barros, supra note 137, at 945 (discussing procedural obstacles to takings claims).
282
See supra Part I.C.
283
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 743 (Breyer, J., concurring).
277
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injunctive relief—offer a simpler, more operative avenue to redress
that requires no doctrinal reconstruction.284
As discussed above, the obstacles to facilitating a judicial takings doctrine are not limited to getting such claims heard; resolving
them is equally problematic.285 Unlike other branches of government, courts do not budget expenses between different public
goals.286 The judiciary’s role is strictly adjudicatory; courts are not
positioned to evaluate the utility of transferring public funds (compensating) to achieve a taking.287 Accordingly, reviewing courts,
particularly at the federal level, may be reluctant to expend public
funds to compensate for judicial takings.
Scalia rebuts this concern by maintaining that the legislature
would still ultimately decide whether to carry out a judicial taking
or restore the affected property rights.288 Although appealing at first
glance, this approach weakens the institutional barrier between the
judiciary and legislature. The judiciary could essentially force the
legislature to act on an issue the legislature has either neglected or
not considered—not to mention deal with the scrutiny and pressure
that come with it.289 Standoffs between discordant legislative officials are conceivable. If the legislature could not procure the requisite votes to statutorily override the judicial taking, it might feel
compelled to pay compensation to avert damaging the government’s
credibility.290 As one commentator explains, “legislative unwillingness to pay compensation in the face of a court order would seem a
willful ducking of a constitutional imperative.”291 Regardless of
how the legislature responds, the ruling court has stepped outside its

284

See Krotoszynski, supra note 281, at 738 (“Lower court judges and government officials have a very good idea of what substantive due process requires
and can identify and apply the appropriate tests with relative ease.”).
285
See supra Part III.A.
286
See Walston, supra note 33, at 436.
287
See id.
288
See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 723–24 (majority opinion).
289
See Thompson, supra note 61, at 1485 (discussing how legislature is more
susceptible to external political pressures than judiciary).
290
Id. at 1517–19. Contrast the affirmative act of paying compensation (and
its accordant externalities) with inaction, the typical legislative course when a requisite number of votes cannot be obtained.
291
Id. at 1518.
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adjudicatory role into an administrative one, compromising traditional separation-of-powers principles.
Of course, like any other legislative process, reviewing a judicial
taking would take time. Meanwhile, aggrieved property owners
would have to wait an indeterminate length of time before receiving
compensation or having their property rights restored. Externalities
from the delayed review of other legislation would also be incurred.
Alternatively, under the Due Process Clause, aggrieved property
owners enjoy immediate restitution in the form of injunctive relief.292 The judiciary would remain within its adjudicatory role and
the legislature need not get involved. Contrary to Scalia’s assertions,
the Due Process Clause would not simply “do the work” of the Takings Clause in this scenario293—it would do it much better.
IV.

COMMENT ON PEÑALVER & STRAHILEVITZ’S ARTICLE:
“JUDICIAL TAKINGS OR DUE PROCESS?”

A.
The Four-Factors Approach
Perhaps a middle ground exists that would satiate both critics
and proponents of a judicial takings doctrine. Legal scholars Eduardo M. Peñalver and Lior Strahilevitz—Professors at Cornell Law
School and University of Chicago Law School, respectively294—offer an intriguing, conciliatory proposal.295 Peñalver purports that
four factors warrant application of the Takings Clause to a judicial
taking: (1) intent to appropriate private property for public use (“appropriatory intent”); (2) repeat player litigants (typically the government); (3) state retention of property for public use; and (4) coordination between the judiciary and another body of government.296 Alternatively, the absence of factors (1) through (3), in conjunction
with self-dealing by the judiciary (as opposed to coordination with
292

See Patrick T. Gillen, Preliminary Injunctive Relief Against Governmental
Defendants: Trustworthy Shield or Sword of Damocles?, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 269,
275–76 (2016).
293
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 720.
294
For the sake of brevity, both authors are referred to collectively as “Peñalver”.
295
See generally Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 305.
296
Id. at 354–55, 355 tbl.1.
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another branch of government), favors due process.297
“[E]xpect[ing] the factors to correlate strongly in the majority of
cases, with the intent element providing much of the connective tissue,” Peñalver does not clarify whether appropriatory intent—or any
other factor—is dispositive.298 This Part establishes that the potential for divergent factors is much higher than Peñalver suggests and
raises concerns about the efficacy of the “four-factors” approach in
practice.
At first glance, “[judicial] intent to appropriate property for public use”299 seems like a fair benchmark for use of the Takings Clause.
After all, the Takings Clause entitles the state to take private property for public use, so long as it provides just compensation.300 The
problem is that it is not always clear when a judge intends to take
private property for public use. For example, suppose a judge demands the surrender of property to satisfy an outstanding tax obligation. Arguably, the judge has “taken” the property for public
use—or at the very least, a public purpose (to retrieve tax dollars
that ultimately benefit the public). The targeted property owner’s
loss is by itself a means to achieving a public end, which is Peñalver’s chief criterion for gauging appropriatory intent.301 It seems
odd, however, to categorize this type of seizure as a taking. The government has no real interest in the functional value of the property,
just its monetary value. Indeed, the third factor of Peñalver’s test—
state retention of the property for public use—is absent, as the government would presumably just auction off the property to another
private owner.
The famous U.S. Supreme Court takings case United States v.
Causby302 offers another useful hypothetical. In Causby, the Court
held that the invasion of a farm owner’s airspace via low-flying military aircraft could be a taking.303 Although Causby did not arise in
the judicial takings context, it illustrates the difficulty in gauging
when land has been intentionally appropriated. Peñalver does wisely
297
298
299
300
301
302
303

Id. at 355 tbl.1.
Id. (discussing four factors warranting judicial takings).
Id. at 355.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 326.
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Id. at 266–67.
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equate the intent to appropriate with the more flexible intent to regulate.304 In Causby, however, the United States assumed that the Air
Commerce Act granted its military aircraft clearance to traverse the
skies at will; it did not target or otherwise intend to regulate the farm
owner’s land at all.305 It follows that an appropriatory intent benchmark is not foolproof and would place judicial takings at odds with
traditional takings. To be clear, the intention here is not to nitpick at
Peñalver’s logic—which really is quite sound—but rather to shed
light on the incongruities presented by a categorical approach to judicial takings. Although limiting the cases that warrant compensation would allay the net impact of the Stop the Beach plurality’s judicial takings doctrine, it would equally muddle the nation’s notoriously perplexing takings jurisprudence.306
The assumption behind Peñalver’s appropriatory intent standard
is that the state will almost always be a party to the action.307 It is
easy to hypothesize, however, disputes between private parties
where a judge could act with appropriatory intent. Matthews308 and
its offspring Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club309
illustrate the most prevalent setting for such private disputes:
beaches. Additionally, private altercations over traditional public forums may elicit rulings fueled by appropriatory intent. In
304

Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 321 n.66 (citing Krotoszynski,
supra note 281, at 718).
305
See Causby, 328 U.S. at 260 (relying on the Air Commerce Act to operate
the overhead aircraft, not eminent domain or any sort of other proceedings directed at the parcel in question).
306
See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 1026 (2000) (equating regulatory takings law to a “murky sea”); D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and
Substantive Due Process, 69 ALB. L. REV. 343, 345 (2005) (denoting takings jurisprudence as “a mass of contradictory caselaw”); Amy C. Brandt, Comment,
Sedona’s Sustainable Growth Ordinance: Testing the Parameters of Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1297, 1313 (1996) (“Unfortunately, case law on
the Takings Clause is both voluminous and confusing.”); see also Peñalver &
Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 321 n.64 (listing cases).
307
Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 354.
308
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
309
Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 851 A.2d 19, 22 (N.J.
2006) (holding that a Beach Club cannot charge public for intermittent recreational beach use).
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Pruneyard, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly endorsed
public petitioning in a shopping mall despite no state advocate.310
Other courts hearing private disputes have sanctioned public distribution of controversial political literature at a private university311
and picketing along the sidewalk outside of a privately-owned casino.312 Once again, in these scenarios, a lack of correlation among
the four factors is apparent: appropriatory intent is present; the presence of a “repeat-player” litigant (the state) is not; state retention of
the property is debatable (the state is not taking ownership of private
property but is nevertheless affirming the public’s indefinite right to
access and utilize it); and coordination is presumably absent without
more evidence.313
Peñalver’s distinction between private and public litigants
touches on a more fundamental problem with his approach: The line
between traditional regulatory takings and disputes allocating property among private parties has been blurred considerably by cases
like Berman,314 Midkiff,315 and Kelo316 that stand for the proposition
that a private-to-private transfer of land can still further a public purpose (and thus constitute a valid exercise of eminent domain). While
these cases stretch the ambit of the Takings Clause to reach a
broader set of public ends (specifically, economic redevelopment),
they discount reliance on appropriatory intent. After all, private-toprivate transfers of land necessarily reflect state intent to do just
that—not appropriate land for public use.317 Peñalver does advocate
310

See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 633 (N.J. 1980) (finding that state constitution permits distribution of political literature at Princeton University).
312
See Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. Loc. Joint Exec. Bd., 257 F.3d 937,
948 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a privately-owned sidewalk outside Casino constitutes public forum subject to First Amendment protections).
313
The difficulties in establishing the coordination factor are discussed in infa
notes 322–28 and accompanying text.
314
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35–36 (1954).
315
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
316
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005).
317
Ironically, Peñalver actually cites Kelo to support the use of intent to classify takings. See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 321–22. He interprets
the dicta in Kelo casting eminent domain where it serves as a pretext for private
gain to seemingly mandate an ad hoc assessment of a condemning body’s “actual
intent.” Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 322 (“In Kelo, however, the
311
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for an extremely broad interpretation of “appropriatory intent” that
borders on illusory.318 But it is hard to envision how, under any rational standard, a judge intends to “appropriate” or “regulate” land
for the public when the court transfers the land to a new private
owner. Such transfers do not facilitate public access, enjoyment, or
even expression;319 they offer only intangible benefits to the public
through future economic redevelopment, at least in the traditional
private-to-private takings context.320
Despite the major questions raised by an appropriatory intent
standard, Peñalver does offer some constructive support for its
use.321 Not so for the fourth factor of his approach: coordination between the judiciary and another branch.322 In short, this factor appears to be an outlier from the other three factors, which are all typical—although certainly not dispositive—hallmarks of takings.323
Contrarily, calculated coordination to facilitate a judicial taking is

Court seemed to go farther [than relying on the explicit language of the Takings
Clause], emphasizing that for an explicit use of eminent domain power the condemnor’s actual intent must be to foster a ‘public use’ . . . .”).
318
Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 322. Peñalver proposes than an
intent to regulate or appropriate be inferred where a “regulation deprives an owner
of a property right that he previously possessed in order to accomplish some valid
public end.” Id. at 321 n.66. Significantly, nothing in this language distinguishes
traditional takings from disputes between private litigants where a judge is indifferent to the winners and losers of the case (e.g., the prototypical due process cases
discussed in Peñalver’s article. See id. at 355). In fact, this standard is very similar
to the all-encompassing judicial takings doctrine proffered in Stop the Beach. See
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702,
715 (2010).
319
Indeed, in Berman, public access to the property was presumably hindered—if not abrogated completely—when the plaintiff’s department store was
condemned. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 31, 33–36.
320
See id. at 34–36.
321
See generally Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 319–335 (exploring, inter alia, questions of intent, coordination, retroactivity, and regulatory takings).
322
See id. at 328–31 (discussing coordination).
323
See id. at 328 (“[T]he Takings Clause addresses situations in which the
government intentionally diminishes a private owner’s property rights to achieve
a legitimate public end, permitting the government to exercise this power but potentially requiring the payment of just compensation.”); id at 329 (noting that coordination is a factor that “acts as a proxy for intent”).
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only present in rare circumstances.324 That’s not to say that coordination isn’t plausible in most cases—another governmental branch
will almost always have some sort of interest in a potential change
in property law.325 It just isn’t clear why coordination should give
rise to takings liability over due process.
A coordinated judicial change in property law still navigates the
proper legislative channels—so the argument to treat it like an ordinary legislative taking falls short. Moreover, the focus should be on
deterring such coordination, not compensating for it. Under Peñalver’s four-factors approach, a colluding judge need not fear their decision being overturned or any apparent sanctions; the only material
consequence of coordination would be an aggrieved party’s compensation.326 Peñalver alternatively argues—effectively—that judicial self-dealing should violate the Due Process Clause and trigger
criminal prosecution in egregious cases.327 His focus on the different
incentives behind coordination and self-dealing, however, misses
the point. Both acts of judicial misconduct compromise the justice
system and—more importantly—place private property rights at
risk.
Establishing coordination among the judiciary and another
branch is not a rudimentary process. The reviewing judge is placed
in a very difficult position; accusing another judge of self-dealing is
one thing but accusing multiple governmental entities of conspiring
with one another requires a good deal of circumstantial evidence and
guesswork.328
324

See id. at 332–33 ([J]udges have relatively little incentive to deprive a private property owner of property because it is more difficult for those judge to
capture the benefits associated with the deprivations . . . . [J]udges are less likely
to engage in self-dealing . . . .”).
325
As a cursory example, perhaps a few zealous government officials realize
they cannot garner the votes to officially adopt the UPC provision discussed in
supra Part III.B. Consequently, they approach the judges sitting on the state supreme court to garner sympathy for their cause. One can plausibly envision the
judges colluding with the officials to adopt the UPC provision. A coordinated
agreement to change property law could be in effect for months—if not years—
in advance of an opportunity to capitalize on a private dispute; it does not have to
arise when the state becomes an interested party in the litigation.
326
See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 328–29.
327
See id. at 329–31.
328
See Krotoszynski, supra note 281, at 766.
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B.
The Underinvestment Problem
Peñalver’s primary concern with judicial takings is consequent
underinvestment in legal representation: Property owners who know
they may be compensated for a judicial taking in the future may underinvest in legal counsel at the outset of litigation.329 Consequently,
plaintiff property owners are less likely to present state court judges
with proper precedent off which to base sound decisions.330 Of
course, this leads to a host of externalities, most notably being that
other property owners not parties to the suit may be deprived of their
own property rights while the erroneous precedent stands (e.g., the
right to accretions).331 Presumably, these affected property owners
would all have a valid judicial takings claim.
Although Peñalver’s underinvestment concerns certainly have
merit, some counterarguments are worth noting. First, a few hours
of any lawyer’s service are still expensive to the average American.332 The tangible present benefits of reduced legal fees may offset
the intangible future costs of underinvestment. Additionally, Peñalver fears that “lower priced, lower quality law firms will be able to
outcompete higher priced, higher quality law firms,”333 but is that
really a bad thing? Lower priced does not always equal lower quality. Many lawyers have low rates simply because they aren’t experienced or well-connected—they might still have excellent legal
minds.334 Indeed, younger, cheaper lawyers looking to establish
themselves may work harder for their clients than their senior counterparts. It follows that, in addition to saving their clients’ money,
underinvestment may help young lawyers secure precious business

329

Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 337.
See id.
331
Id. at 337–38.
332
See Michael Zuckerman, Is There Such Thing as an Affordable Lawer?
ATLANTIC (May 30, 2014) https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2014/05/is-there-such-a-thing-as-an-affordable-lawyer/371746/.
333
Id. at 341–42.
334
In fact, “[h]istorically, most attorneys in the United States have created
their own jobs by establishing solo and small law firms . . . . Attorney demographics confirm that the majority of lawyers in private practice are self-employed.” Luz E. Herrera, Training Lawyer-Entrepreneurs, 89 DENV. U. L. REV.
887, 889 (2012).
330
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opportunities.335 Again, the premise behind Peñalver’s underinvestment argument is sound—but there are some counterbalancing policy considerations.
To mitigate the underinvestment problem, Peñalver proposes
that comparative and contributory fault be introduced into the compensation scheme for judicial takings: A client that fails to bring relevant precedent to a court’s attention would “suffer some percentage
reduction” from the compensation to which he is entitled under the
Takings Clause.336 Under due process, such a client would be denied
a remedy altogether—similar to a contributory negligence standard.337 There are several glaring problems with this remedial approach. For one, it seems arbitrary to ascribe a “percentage of fault”
for omission of some particular precedent.338 The relevancy of precedent is unique to the case-at-hand, and a judge’s subjective disposition towards the precedent could cost a client thousands of dollars.
Additionally, clients should not be punished for the negligence of
counsel. Even highly qualified lawyers who put in long hours of research may fail to uncover important precedent at times. Thus, even
where a client does make a substantial investment in counsel, the
remedy to which he is justly entitled could still be abated or—under
due process—abrogated completely. It follows that fear of comparative/contributory fault might ironically encourage overinvestment
in legal representation. Lawyers (and law students) would welcome
these extra billable hours, but clients certainly wouldn’t.
Peñalver himself proffers another notable aversion to using comparative/contributory fault: It could spread into traditional takings.
More specifically, “[comparative/contributory fault] might be expanded to cover ordinary takings cases where a well-connected constituent had failed to mount any political resistance against a regulation.”339 If this were to occur, landowners would be galvanized to
resist new property law as a preemptive strike against a future unsatisfactory takings verdict.340 Although citizen involvement in the
335

See id. at 897–98 (discussing benefits of providing smaller low-cost ser-

vices).
336
337
338
339
340

Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 363.
See id. at 364.
See id. at 363.
Id. at 363.
See id.
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legislative process should generally be encouraged, a “scorched
earth”341 approach from fearful property owners could inhibit utilitarian legislation. This foreboding, while speculative, should not be
discounted; a new remedial modus operandi that is “a concept is
quite foreign to takings jurisprudence”342 naturally carries substantial risk.
Peñalver illustrates the underinvestment problem by hypothesizing the outcome of Stop the Beach had the U.S. Supreme Court not
been presented with the binding state precedent from Martin v.
Busch.343 If the Solicitor General (or the Court’s clerks) had not
brought Martin to the Court’s attention, the Court might have overlooked the State’s right to artificial avulsions and (wrongly) ruled
for the property owners.344 In this instance, the plurality may very
well have charged the Florida Supreme Court with committing a judicial taking.345 Moreover, by “taking” the restored beach from the
State (or the public), the U.S. Supreme Court would have conceivably “committed a judicial taking of its own”!346 This is a frightening
yet very plausible scenario that adds a new twist to the procedural
judicial takings conundrum. Should the U.S. Supreme Court not
grant a rehearing in light of Martin, how would the Court’s judicial
taking be reviewed? As Peñalver avers, “[w]ho is to police judicial
takings by the highest judicial body?”347
Equally disconcerting, the State would have no apparent remedy
under the Takings Clause in Peñalver’s Stop the Beach/Martin hypothetical.348 Damages would not restitute the public’s loss of access
to the beaches. The only proper remedy would be invalidation of the
decision, which of course sounds like a job for the Due Process
Clause. This remedial issue captures one of the most disconcerting
aspects of a judicial takings doctrine: If a court rules that private
property rights do not exist, the private property owners may seek
compensation; if, however, the court rules for the private property
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348

See id.
Id.
See id. at 349–50.
Id. at 349.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 349–50.
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owners—abrogating public property rights in the process—the public has no apparent recourse. In essence, federal judges are protecting private property owners from renegade state judges but are not
protecting the public from those same judges.
C.

Underlying Criticisms of Peñalver & Strahilevitz’s Article
Peñalver segues from his Stop the Beach/Martin hypothetical to
a proposed procedural due process test that would purportedly frustrate underinvestment in legal counsel.349 In so doing, Peñalver toys
with the idea of invalidating the claims of non-party property owners
that fail to intervene or file an amicus brief in the original suit.350
Such a radical measure entails serious constitutional and fairness
concerns that are beyond the scope of this Article. There is no question, however, that extending contributory fault to non-party claimants would open a pandora’s box of new issues. For one thing, it is
naive to assume that at-risk property owners are closely following
court dockets. Particularly in larger jurisdictions, there are too many
cases today for property owners to sift through, let alone consult
with counsel about. More importantly, placing an affirmative burden
on non-party property owners to intercede in an outside case would
greatly lower the bar for what constitutes a “reasonable opportunity
to be heard”—or satisfactory due process.351 Such a burden would
contravene the popular conviction that “everyone deserves their fair
day in court.”

349

See id. at 350 (“[T]here [is] an alternative to this possibility of merry-goround litigation . . . . Due process provides a sensible framework for considering
these issues.”). The reasoning behind the procedural due process test offered by
Peñalver is difficult to grasp. The gist of Peñalver’s argument appears to be that a
Matthews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) test balancing a property owner’s investment in counsel with the value of the interests at stake would promote efficiency and mitigate the underinvestment problem. See id. at 350–51. Peñalver,
however, does not clarify the scope of this test or how it should be implemented
in conjunction with his four-factors approach. Indeed, it is not clear exactly what
Peñalver is proposing here at all.
350
See id. at 351–52.
351
Peñalver actually bolsters this point with his own policy arguments. See id.
at 352. (“Because property law is designed to promote secure investments, the law
hesitates to impose on owners an affirmative burden to remain constantly vigilant
about shifting legal doctrines that may affect their rights.”).
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Despite detailing how his proposed remedial safeguards could
accommodate non-party property owners, Peñalver glosses over the
more fundamental procedural obstacles that non-party judicial taking claims must overcome.352 Peñalver (accurately) prognosticates
that Williamson County shouldn’t keep non-party judicial takings
claims from reaching state court but does not explain how state
courts would handle these claims.353 As established above, state
court systems are not designed to facilitate judicial takings; fortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court recently opened the door to federal
judicial taking claims by overruling the state-litigation requirement
of Williamson County.354 Federal jurisdiction over judicial takings
claims, however, poses its own practical and federalism concerns.355
When viewed in context with these broader, more palpable issues,
underinvestment in legal representation seems like a somewhat trivial problem for Peñalver to dwell on. The appeal of his four-factor
approach would be stronger if he spent more time addressing how it
would mitigate the procedural challenges and political impacts of
judicial takings.
Peñalver deserves credit for proposing such a unique compromise between the Takings Clause and due process; his effort to harmonize private and public property interests is certainly admirable.
In this author’s opinion, however, Peñalver tries too hard to appease
advocates for private property rights. For example, one of the key
“implications” of Peñalver’s four-factor approach is that takings
claimants will enjoy a much higher success rate than due process
claimants.356 Accordingly, Peñalver takes a notably defensive stance
towards the odds of prevailing on due process grounds,357 when he
should be accentuating the positives of a low-success rate for due
process claims.

352

See id. at 361–62.
See id. (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)).
354
See supra Part III.A.
355
See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
356
Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 355–56.
357
See id. at 360 (“Although the argument that a state action is arbitrary under
the rational basis test is usually thought to be virtually impossible for a claimant
to win, there are a number of reasons to think it would not be a futile argument to
make . . . .”).
353

2021]

THE DAWN OF A JUDICIAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE

853

Consider the consequences of a high success rate for judicial
takings claims. Proponents warn that courts manipulate the system
to abrogate private property rights,358 but an easy path to compensation could actually lead property owners to manipulate the judiciary.
Abundant judicial takings claims would exhaust court resources and
present numerous externalities. Most significantly, fear of committing a taking would discourage judges from modifying property law
to meet societal demands. Peñalver gets so caught up in the nuances
of his proposal that he loses sight of these great social costs. Phrased
differently, Peñalver fails to convince this author that the benefits a
compensatory judicial takings remedy offers private property owners outweighs the costs it imposes on the public.
Peñalver equates judicial takings to “a car [ ] careening off the
road.”359 The tense, nebulous opinion issued in Stop the Beach certainly lends credence to this metaphor. While, however, Peñalver
purports that his conciliatory approach would crash the car “into the
bushes [rather] than into a crowded café,”360 this author believes that
it’s not too late to navigate the car back onto the road. A firm commitment from the U.S. Supreme Court to regulate judicial takings
under the Due Process Clause would go a long way towards steering
the car in the right direction. Hopefully, the Stop the Beach plurality
will read this Article and react accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Stop the Beach was supposed to shed some light over the perplexing issue of judicial takings. Instead, the divided, inchoate opinion offers more questions than answers. How the plurality’s judicial
takings doctrine would function in practice is not entirely clear, but
some of its consequences are. Due process offers a practical alternative for courts to employ that nullifies or mitigates these
358
See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 61, at 1544 (“By exempting courts from
taking protections, we create an imbalance that invites the state to attempt to accomplish through the judiciary what it cannot accomplish through other branches
of government . . . . By applying the takings protections to the judiciary, we encourage courts to be more sensitive to the impact that their decisions have on
property holders and thereby protect the values embedded in the takings protections.”).
359
Id. at 368.
360
Id.
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consequences. The familiar, inherently broad Due Process Clause
already plays a pivotal role in takings jurisprudence, and the Supreme Court would be well grounded in adapting it in lieu of the
judicial takings doctrine proposed in Stop the Beach.

